Abstract: Two types of analyses are conducted to explain the determinants of labour contracts length. The first analysis emphasizes on the contracting costs and the level of uncertainty. The second analysis focuses on the incentive and selection effect of the contract length. This paper test the determinants for contract duration by means of econometric duration models. The estimates are carried out from French data (TDE). An econometric treatment of the endogeneity of the labour contract status and unobservable heterogeneity is carried out. Our results show that wages positively affect employment duration. This confirms the positive effect of contracting costs reported.
Introduction:
The recent period is characterized by an evolution of the working relationship in the industrialized countries. Indeed, many studies highlight an increase in the proportion of shortterm contracts. There is a growth in these temporary forms of employment compared to longer contracts in France as well as in the other European countries.
The literature about contract duration can be classified in two distinct categories. A first type of analysis (Canzoneri, 1980; Dye, 1985; Danziger, 1988) considers the duration of contracts from an external point of view. By external we mean that the temporary dimension of the employment relationship between an employer and one or more workers results from a search for a structure which can efficiently adapt to uncertainty affecting the external environment of the firm represented by real and monetary shocks. A second type of analysis (Cantor, 1990; Jovanic, 1979; Lazear, 1979; Loh, 1994) apprehends the duration of employment according to the internal environment of the firm. It is the search for performance in personnel management, selection of skilled workers, and control of the input of work which generates the duration of the relation between the employer and the employee.
To do so, firms have to incite, control and organize these human resources by means of contract duration.
The early theoretical contributions emphasize that uncertainty and volatility are negatively related to contract length, whereas contracting costs positively affect duration. Gray (1978) argues that contract length should be positively related to transactions costs and inversely related to uncertainty, regardless of whether the uncertainty pertains to real or nominal shocks. These implications arise from two basic ingredients: a transaction-cost argument and an efficient-production argument. The former emphasizes that longer contracts lower the losses due to transaction costs. The latter stresses that shorter contracts reduce the expected losses due to inefficient production and employment. This is true because the expected losses increase with the deviation of the actual real wage from the real wage that would equate the demand and supply of labour, and such a deviation is greater for more distant periods as uncertainty rises over time. Dye (1985) builds a model which tries to overcome some of the limitations of Gray's approach, finding the same theoretical implications about uncertainty and contracting costs.
More recent models, however, stress that uncertainty and volatility may have a positive effect on contract length under some circumstances. Danziger (1988) develops an implicit contract model where workers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral. Within this framework, contracts allow for efficient-risk-sharing between parties and provide workers with a means of insuring against income fluctuations due to aggregate productivity shocks. As a consequence, greater real uncertainty causes workers to seek increased insurance through longer contracts.
In the following analysis, we will limit ourselves to an internal analysis about personnel management: the role short-terms contracts can play in the policy of incentive and control of employees. Studies in labour microeconomics based on game theory implicitly point out this principle again since they stress the importance of the temporary framework on the behaviours adopted by the agents and the results of game. In the same way, Lazear (1979) like Cantor (1988 Cantor ( , 1990 proposed a dynamic approach of personnel management. Cantor (1988 Cantor ( , 1990 ) highlights a certain number of determinants of the optimal contract duration: this tends to decrease when the present preferential rate increases, or if the cost in term of utility associated with the same effort is higher. On the other hand this duration lengthens when the share of the quasi rent allocated to the employee increases.
In the next part, we will study shorter contracts as a probationary stage, in a context where optimal matching is not immediate and where dismissal costs dissuade firms to break contract relations. We will also point out how temporary contracts can be stepping stones to permanent employment. Recent studies dispute the common view that fixed-term contracts actually offer firms increased flexibility due to restrictions that typically apply to the rolling over of these contracts (Hunt, 2000) . However, firms have a number of reasons to use fixedterm contracts or temporary contracts. First, temporary workers may be preferred because they are less costly to employ. Second, fixed-term contracts, like other temporary contractual types, are preferred alternatives when temporary or temporarily vacant positions need to be filled. Third, in the case where there is uncertainty about the value of the match. The theory of the matching suggested by Jovanovic (1979) , constitutes the model of reference integrating this dimension of the labour market. According to these authors, it is necessary to install a mechanism making it possible to produce an optimal pairing in order to reach an efficient production. Firms view the initial fixed-term contracts as a probationary stage. Depending on the job performance and labour demand, workers will move into permanent employment within the firm. As pointed out by Loh (1994) , Rosen (1994) and Lazear (1995) probationary periods may induce self-selection of those workers with higher ability because they have a higher probability to obtain permanent contracts. Temporary contracts with lower wages are therefore a sorting instrument for firms. Low wages during the temporary contract period will be compensated for by higher future wages at the same employer (Lazear, 1979) . This paper use the French data to investigate the external and internal determinants of the contract length evoked in the literature analyses. In the next section we highlight the econometric problems encountered to test the micro-economic determinants of the duration of the contracts. In the third section, data used for this study is examined. Estimation results are reported in the forth section. Finally, a synthesis of the main results is given as a conclusion.
The econometric model
The econometric evaluation of the determinants of the labour contract duration encounters a basic problem, ie the endogeneity of the labour contract status. Indeed, the employment duration on the labour market varies according to the contract status. Since the selection into longer or shorter contracts is not random, it is important to account for the selection mechanism in order to estimate the determinants of contract duration in an unbiased way and this was demonstrated through some empirical studies which investigate the endogeneity of the contractual status on the employment duration (Booth and Al, 2002b) .
Moreover, Hagen (2003) stresses that it is necessary to take the mechanism of selection into account to estimate unbiased effect of fixed-term contracts (FTC) on wages.
According to the econometric model, the duration of survival in employment has to be estimated with the various labour contract statuses. In the sample, the distribution of the individuals between the different classes of employment contracts is not random but raises an endogenous selection mechanism. We propose a model representing three types of labour
The issue of selecting individuals is made clearer if the individuals' specific characteristics determine the choice of the contract. We can suppose that some of these determinants also have an influence on the duration of survival in employment. The problem which we encounter is to isolate the real effect of the labour contract status. It is therefore necessary to determine the elements which influence the duration of the employment contract and we will adopt the method suggested by Heckman and Robb (1985) for that purpose. The advantage of this method is that it offers a very vast choice of duration models. However, if we adopted the Heckman's method (1979) 1 , we would had to restrict ourselves to normal distribution.
Our approach initially consists in instrumenting the probability whether the individual has an indefinite-term contract (ITC) or a fixed-term contract (FTC), or a temporary contract (TC) by a multinomial logit model 2 . The predicted probabilities are then integrated for final estimation in the parametric duration model in order to control for the endogeneity of the labour contract status. The econometric model is introduced in the following way : 
We estimate i DE , the employment duration, according to the individual characteristics i X and the estimated probabilities for the labour contract status. The parametric estimation of the duration model under this specification makes it possible to obtain unbiased estimators.
Data
We exploit 
Estimation results:

Multinomial logit estimation of labour contract status:
In this section, the determinants of the labour contract status (ITC, FTC, TC) are analysed by the estimation of the logit multinomial model (see table 2 ). This corresponds to the estimation of the sample selection of our model.
The fixed-term contract (FTC) concerns especially workers aged 16-34, relative to the base of individuals over 50 years old. Since the majority of young people have no professional experience on the labour market, they accept even precarious working conditions. This result is confirmed by Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002a) on English data. However, it is noticed that workers aged 34-50 are granted indefinite-term contracts (ITC). Lazear and Rosen (1990) and Booth and al. (2002a) show that women more often hold temporary contracts. This result confirms that being a man has a positive and significant probability of getting an ITC. The chances of having an established position under indefinite contract duration are higher for Europeans than for non-European people.
The results show that workers with low human capital (primary education, general education and techniques) hold more temporary contracts than the workers with university degree. People who undertook university studies have a higher probability to obtain indefinite contract duration.
We use the occupation of the individuals' father as a proxy for permanent income.
Social origin variables indicate that children of executive or intermediary professions have a higher probability of holding indefinite-term contracts relative to children of workmen. On the other hand, children of farmers hold fixed-term contracts whereas temporary contracts meet more success with children of workmen.
Relative to resignation, individuals entering unemployment at the end of their FTC have a lower probability to obtain an ITC than dismissed individuals and those who left their Examining the significance of the search strategy for employment enables us to classify a grid of research for each type of labour contract. Indeed, using market methods (reference: schools) increases the probability of getting an ITC or FTC. The probability of holding a fixed-term contract is greater when individuals use a local employment agency as well as the market method for search in new employment.
Individuals with unemployment benefit are more likely to reach fixed-term contracts or temporary contracts than indefinite-term contracts. The local rate of unemployment tends to increase the probability of precarious employment (FTC-TC). Persistence of unemployment obviously makes the recourse to this type of employment much more frequent.
Analysis of the results of parametric estimation:
In this section, various parametric estimates were carried out while controlling the endogeneity of labour contract statuses (see table 3 ). In order to compare the various specifications (Weibull, Log normal, Log logistic), the Akaike information criterion is used. It is the model minimizing the function of the information criteria which is chosen, i.e. the Weibull distribution model. The hazard rate of leaving employment is thus monotonous. In order to reinforce the robustness of the econometric estimate of the Weibull specification, we estimated this duration model by introducing a correction for unobserved heterogeneity by the Gamma distribution (Lancaster, 1990) . In the next part, we will interpret the results relative to Location in the CERGY, MANTES POSSY, and ROUBAIX labor-market employment areas has a negative and significant effect over employment duration compared to AIX and MARSEILLES. This can be due to the fact that these areas are characterized by more uncertainty on the job supply.
Conclusion:
The microeconomic analysis of contract lengths proposed in this article highlights several stylized facts. On the one hand, the analyses of Gray (1978) , Canzoneri (1980) , and
Danziger (1988) Heckman and Robb (1985) method and unobservable heterogeneity (Lancaster, 1990 ) was carried out.
The results of the estimate of a duration model by introducing a correction of unobserved heterogeneity by the Gamma distribution conclude that there is an endogeneity of the labour contract status. Besides, employment duration is all the more large as wages are high. This confirms the positive effect of the contracting costs evoked by Gray and Canzoneri over the contract length. Moreover, the fact of having a latest labour contract of over two years of time can explain the increase in the duration of the recent contract, which is close to the theoretical results of the Rosen and Lazear models. (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at de 5%, (*) significant at 10%. (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at de 5%, (*) significant at 10%. (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at de 5%, (*) significant at 10%.
